

# Markov Decision Processes

*Sequential decision-making with perfect observation*

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# Examples of Markov decision processes

Optimal gambling

Optimal inventory management

Power-delay trade-off in wireless

Call options

Optimal choice

Energy storage

These examples illustrate how to use Markov decision theory to establish **qualitative properties** of optimal strategies. Such properties are useful because:

- ▶ they appeal to decision makers,
- ▶ they enable efficient computation,
- ▶ they are easy to implement.

# MDP Example: Optimal gambling




# Description of an optimization problem faced by a gambler

## Optimal gambling

A gambler goes to a casino with an initial fortune of  $\$x_1$  and places bets over time and must leave after  $T$  bets. Let  $X_t$  denote the gambler's fortune after  $t$  bets. In this example, **time** denotes the number of times that the gambler has bet.

At time  $t$ , the gambler may place a bet for any amount  $U_t$  less than his current fortune  $X_t$ . If he wins the bet (denoted by the event  $W_t = 1$ ), the casino gives him the amount that he had bet. If he loses the bet (denoted by the event  $W_t = -1$ ), he pays the casino the amount that he had bet.



The outcomes of the bets  $\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T$  are **primitive random variables**, i.e., they are independent of each other, of the gambler's initial fortune, and the gambler's betting strategy. Let  $\mathbb{P}(W_t = 1) = p$ .



The gambler's payoff is  $\log X_T$ . Find the **optimal gambling strategy** for the gambler that maximizes the expected value of his payoff.


# Mathematical setup of optimal gambling problem

**Notation** State :  $X_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$   
Action :  $U_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$   
Feasible actions:  $U_t(x_t) = \{u_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} : u_t \leq x_t\}$


**Dynamics**  $X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t U_t$  where  $U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$

**Rewards** Per step reward:  $r_t(x_t, u_t) = 0$   
Terminal reward:  $r_T(x_T) = \log x_T$


**Illustration** Fortune of gambler over time for three possible strategies for  $x_1 = 10$ ,  $p = 0.6$ ,  $T = 25$  (1000 sample paths).



Strategy  $U_t = X_t$



Strategy  $U_t = \min\{4, X_t\}$



Strategy  $U_t = 0.4X_t$

— denotes  $\mathbb{E}[X_t]$ ; — denotes  $30 \mathbb{E}[\log X_t]$ .

# The optimal gambling problem is a special case of a MDP

## MDP Dynamic Model

## Optimal Gambling

System  
Dynamics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t, W_t)$$

$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t U_t$$

Information  
Structure

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

Objective  
Function

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} r_t(X_t, U_t) + r_T(X_T) \right]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\log X_T]$$

Structure of  
Controller

Using **Markov strategies** does not entail any loss of optimality

$$U_t = g_t(X_t)$$

Dynamic  
program

$$V_T(x_T) = r_T(x_T);$$

$$V_t(x_t) = \max_{u_t \in \mathcal{U}_t(x_t)} \left\{ r_t(x_t, u_t) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(f_t(x_t, u_t, W_t))] \right\},$$

$$t = T - 1, \dots, 1.$$

# Closed form solution of optimal gambling

**Theorem** When  $p \leq 0.5$ :

- ▶ the optimal strategy is to **not gamble**, specifically,  $g_t(x) = 0$ ;
- ▶ the value function is  $V_t(x) = \log x$ .

When  $p > 0.5$ :

- ▶ the optimal strategy is to **bet a fraction of the current fortune**, specifically,  $g_t(x) = (2p - 1)x$ ;
- ▶ the value function is  $V_t(x) = \log x + (T - t)C$   
where  $C = \log 2 + p \log p + (1 - p) \log(1 - p)$ .

# Backward induction proof of the solution ( $p \leq 0.5$ )

**Proof of Case 1:** Let  $p = \mathbb{P}(W_t = 1)$  and  $q = \mathbb{P}(W_t = -1)$ . Then  $p \leq 0.5$  implies  $p \leq q$ .

$p \leq 0.5$  Proceed by backward induction.

- ▶ **Basis:** For  $t = T$ ,  $V_T(x) = \log x$ .
- ▶ **Induction hypothesis:** For  $t = t + 1$ ,  $V_{t+1}(x) = \log x$ , and  $g_{t+1}(x) = 0$ .
- ▶ **Induction step:** Define  $Q_t(x, u) = pV_{t+1}(x + u) + qV_{t+1}(x - u)$ .

$$\frac{\partial Q_t(x, u)}{\partial u} = \frac{p}{x + u} - \frac{q}{x - u} < 0; \implies Q_t(x, u) \text{ is decreasing in } u$$

$$\therefore g_t(x) = \arg \max_{u \in [0, x]} Q_t(x, u) = 0; \implies V_t(x) = Q_t(x, g_t(x)) = \log x.$$



# Backward induction proof of the solution ( $p > 0.5$ )

**Proof of Case 2:** Let  $p = \mathbb{P}(W_t = 1)$  and  $q = \mathbb{P}(W_t = -1)$ . Then  $p > 0.5$  implies  $p > q$ .

$p > 0.5$  Proceed by backward induction.

- ▶ **Basis:** For  $t = T$ ,  $V_T(x) = \log x$ .
- ▶ **Induction hypothesis:** For  $t = t + 1$ ,

$$V_{t+1}(x) = \log x + (T - t - 1)C, \quad \text{and} \quad g_{t+1}(x) = (p - q)x;$$

where  $C = \log 2 + p \log p + q \log q$ .

- ▶ **Induction step:** Define  $Q_t(x, u) = pV_{t+1}(x + u) + qV_{t+1}(x - u)$ .

$$\frac{\partial Q_t(x, u)}{\partial u} = \frac{p}{x + u} - \frac{q}{x - u}; \implies \text{Extremum } u = (p - q)x.$$


$$\text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 Q_t(x, u)}{\partial u^2} = -\frac{p}{(x + u)^2} - \frac{q}{(x - u)^2} < 0;$$

$$\therefore g_t(x) = \arg \max_{u \in [0, x]} Q_t(x, u) = (p - q)x;$$

$$\implies V_t(x) = Q_t(x, g_t(x)) = \log x + (T - t)C.$$


# Maximizing $\mathbb{E}[\log X_T]$ does not maximize $\mathbb{E}[X_T]$

**Illustration** Recall previous setup:  $x_1 = 10$ ,  $p = 0.6$ ,  $T = 25$  (1000 sample paths).




Strategy  $U_t = 0.4X_t$

— denotes  $\mathbb{E}[X_t]$ ; — denotes  $30 \mathbb{E}[\log X_t]$ .



Strategy  $U_t = 0.6X_t$



Strategy  $U_t = 0.2X_t$

The strategy  $g_t(x) = (p = q)x = 0.2x$  maximizes  $\mathbb{E}[\log X_T]$ .  
It does **not maximize**  $\mathbb{E}[X_T]$  or  $\mathbb{E}[\log X_T]$ .

Utility of gambler:  $\log x$

# Generalized model: If terminal reward is increasing in $x$ , then value function is increasing in $x$ and decreasing in $t$

**Generalization** The terminal reward  $r_T(x)$  is monotone increasing in  $x$

**Theorem** For the generalized optimal gambling problem

- ▶ For each  $x$ , the value function  $V_t(x)$  is monotone decreasing in  $t$ .
- ▶ For each  $t$ , the value function  $V_t(x)$  is monotone increasing in  $x$ .

**Proof:  $V_t(x)$  is monotone in  $t$**  Let  $p = \mathbb{P}(W_t = 1)$  and  $Q_t(x, u) = pV_{t+1}(x + u) + (1 - p)V_{t+1}(x - u)$ .  
Then,  $V_t(x) = \max_{u \in [0, x]} Q_t(x, u) \geq Q_t(x, 0) = V_{t+1}(x)$ .

**Proof:  $V_t(x)$  is monotone in  $x$**  Proceed by backward induction.

- ▶ **Basis:** By assumption,  $r_T(x)$  is monotone increasing in  $x$ .
- ▶ **Induction hypothesis:**  $V_{t+1}(x)$  is monotone increasing in  $x$ .
- ▶ **Induction step:**  $\forall x_1, x_2, u \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ , such that  $x_1 \leq x_2$  and  $u \leq x_1$ ,

$$V_{t+1}(x_1) \leq V_{t+1}(x_2) \implies Q_t(x_1, u) \leq Q_t(x_2, u).$$

$$\therefore V_t(x_1) = \max_{u \in [0, x_1]} Q_t(x_1, u) \leq \max_{u \in [0, x_1]} Q_t(x_2, u) \leq \max_{u \in [0, x_2]} Q_t(x_2, u) = V_t(x_2)$$

# Exercises and further reading on optimal gambling

1. For generalization of this problem, read: Sheldon M. Ross, “[Dynamic Programming and Gambling Models](#)”, *Advances in Applied Probability*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1974), pp. 593-606. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1426236>
2. Find the expected reward of using the [all-in strategy](#)  $g_t(x) = x$ .
3. Find the expected reward of using the [proportional-betting strategy](#)  $g_t(x) = \alpha x$  as a function of  $\alpha$ . Use this expression to optimize over the value of  $\alpha$ .
4. [Bonus question](#): Find conditions on the terminal reward function  $r_T$  such that the optimal gambling strategy is increasing in  $x$ .

# MDP Example: Optimal inventory management



Image credit: [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Modern\\_warehouse\\_with\\_pallet\\_rack\\_storage\\_system.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Modern_warehouse_with_pallet_rack_storage_system.jpg)

# Description of an optimization problem faced by online retailers in managing inventory

**Inventory management** Retail stores stockpile products in warehouses to meet the random demand. Additional stocks are procured at regular intervals. Let  $X_t$  denote the amount of stock before the  $t$ -th procurement. In this example, **time** denotes the number of additional stock procurements.


At time  $t$ , the store may procure an addition stock  $U_t$  units at a cost of \$ $p$  per unit. Thus the total **procurement cost** is  $pU_t$ .

The random demand  $W_t$  is i.i.d. with distribution  $P_W$ . The stock available at the next time is  $X_{t+1} = X_t + U_t - W_t$ , where a negative stock denotes backlogged demand.

**Holding cost  $h(x)$**

$$\begin{cases} ax, & \text{if } x \geq 0 \\ -bx, & \text{if } x < 0 \end{cases}$$

The **holding cost** for the stock is given by  $h(x)$  where  $a$  is the per-unit storage cost and  $b$  is the per-unit backlog cost.



Per-stage cost is  $c(X_{t+1}, U_t) = h(X_{t+1}) + pU_t$ . Find the **optimal inventory control strategy** to minimize the expected total cost over a finite horizon.


# Mathematical setup of the inventory management problem

Notation State :  $X_t \in \mathbb{Z}$   
Action:  $U_t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$


Dynamics  $X_{t+1} = X_t + U_t - W_t$ , where  $U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$ .

Cost Per-stage cost:  $c_t(x_{t+1}, u_t) = h(x_{t+1}) + pu_t$   
Terminal cost :  $c_T(x_{T+1}) = h(x_{T+1})$


Illustration Cost incurred by the retail store for three possible strategies for  $x_1 = 0$ ,  $p = 1$ ,  $a = 2$ ,  $b = 3$ ,  $P_W = \text{Unif}[0, 10]$ ,  $T = 25$  (250 sample paths)



Strategy  $U_t = 10 \mathbb{1}_{\{x \leq 0\}}$



Strategy  $U_t = 10 \mathbb{1}_{\{x \leq 5\}}$



Strategy  $U_t = (7 - x) \mathbb{1}_{\{x \leq 7\}}$

# Optimal inventory management is a special case of a MDP

## MDP Dynamic Model

## Optimal inventory management

System  
Dynamics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t, W_t)$$

$$X_{t+1} = X_t + U_t - W_t$$

Information  
Structure

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

Objective  
Function

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T c_t(X_t, U_t, X_{t+1}) \right]$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T pU_t + h(X_{t+1}) \right]$$

Structure of  
Controller

Using **Markov strategies** does not entail any loss of optimality

$$U_t = g_t(X_t)$$

Dynamic  
program

$$V_{T+1}(x_{T+1}) = 0;$$

$$V_t(x_t) = \min_{u_t \in \mathcal{U}_t(x_t)} \mathbb{E}[c_t(x_t, u_t, X_{t+1}) + V_{t+1}(X_{t+1})]$$

$$| X_t = x_t, U_t = u_t], \quad t = T, \dots, 1.$$



# Qualitative properties of the value function

Definition

$$Y_t = X_t + U_t$$

$$L(y_t) = \mathbb{E} [a[y_t - W_t]^+ + b[W_t - y_t]^+], \quad \text{where } [x]^+ = \max(0, x).$$

$$Q_t(y_t) = p y_t + L(y_t) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(y_t - W_t)]$$

$$S_t = \arg \min_{y_t \in \mathbb{R}} Q_t(y_t)$$

**Lemma**  $L(y)$  is convex in  $y$ .

This result is true as long as the holding cost is convex.

**Lemma**  $V_t(x) = \min_{y \geq x} Q_t(y) - px$  and  $g_t(x) = y_t^* - x_t$  where  $y_t^* = \arg \min_{y \geq x} Q_t(y)$ .

**Theorem**

- ▶  $\forall x, y$ , the functions  $Q_t(y)$  and  $V_t(x)$  are decreasing in  $t$ .
- ▶  $\forall t$ ,  $V_t(x) + px$  is increasing in  $x$ .

# Backward induction proof of qualitative properties

- Proof of monotonicity in  $t$**  Proceed by backward induction.
- ▶ **Basis:** For completeness, define  $Q_{T+1}(y) \equiv py$ .
  - ▶ By definition,  $Q_{T+1}(y) = py \leq py + L(y) = Q_T(y)$ .
  - ▶ By definition,  $V_{T+1}(x) = 0 \leq V_T(x)$ .
  - ▶ **Induction hypothesis:**  $V_{t+1}(x) \leq V_{t+2}(x)$  for all  $x$ .
  - ▶ **Induction step:**

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t(y) &= py + L(y) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(y - W)] \\ &\geq py + L(y) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+2}(y - W)] = Q_{t+1}(y) \end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} V_t(x) &= \min_{y \geq x} Q_t(y) - px \\ &\geq \min_{y \geq x} Q_{t+1}(y) - px = V_{t+1}(x) \end{aligned}$$

- Proof of monotonicity in  $x$**  In the next Theorem, we show that  $Q_t(y)$  is convex in  $y$  for all  $t$ .  
Therefore,  $V_t(x) + px = \min_{y \geq x} Q_t(y)$  is increasing in  $x$ .

# A base stock strategy is optimal

**Theorem** For all  $t$ ,  $Q_t(y)$  and  $V_t(x)$  are convex in  $y$  and  $x$  respectively. Furthermore,  $V_t$  is given by

$$V_t(x) = \begin{cases} Q_t(S_t) - px, & \text{if } x \leq S_t \\ Q_t(x) - px, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and the optimal strategy is a **base stock** strategy given by

$$g_t^*(x_t) = [S_t - x_t]^+.$$

# Backward induction proof of the optimal strategy

**Proof** Proceed by backward induction.





**Basis:**

- ▶  $Q_T(y) = py + L(y)$  and is, therefore, convex.
- ▶  $V_T(x) = \min_{y \geq x} Q_T(y) - px$ . The minimizing  $y = \max(x, S_T)$ .
- ▶  $V_T(x)$  is convex and has the desired form.

**Induction hypothesis:**  $V_{t+1}(x)$  is convex and has the desired form.

**Induction step:**


- ▶  $Q_t(y) = py + L(y) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(y - W_t)]$  is convex.
- ▶  $V_t(x) = \min_{y \geq x} Q_t(y) - px$ . The minimizing  $y = \max(x, S_t)$ .
- ▶  $V_t(x)$  is convex and has the desired form.



# Further reading on optimal inventory management

1. The mathematical model of inventory management considered here was originally proposed in the following seminal paper: Kenneth J. Arrow, Theodore Harris, Jacob Marschak “[Optimal Inventory Policy](#)”, *Econometrica*, pp 250–272, Jul 1951.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1906813>
2. The optimality of base-stock policy was first presented in R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, “[On the optimal inventory equation](#)”, *Management Science*, pp 83–104, 1955.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2627240>
3. **Bonus question:** Find conditions under which the optimal thresholds  $S_t$  are decreasing in  $t$ .

# MDP Example: Optimal power-delay trade-off in wireless communication



# Design of rate-allocation protocol in wireless communication

## Rate allocation in MAC layer

In a cell phone, higher layer applications (voice, email, etc.) data packets; these packets are buffered in a queue and the transmission protocol decides how many packets to transmit at each step.

At time  $t$ ,  $X_t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  packets are buffered in the queue; the transmission protocol transmits  $U_t \leq X_t$ ,  $U_t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  packets, and  $W_t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}$  new packets arrive. Thus,  $X_{t+1} = X_t - U_t + W_t$ . The delay incurred by the packets are proportional to  $d(X_t - U_t)$ , where

- ▶  $d(\cdot)$  is strictly increasing and convex; moreover  $d(0) = 0$ .

## Power-allocation in physical layer

The transmission protocol sets the transmit power such that the signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver, which depends on channel fading, is sufficiently high.

At time  $t$ ,  $S_t \in \mathcal{S}$  denotes the state of channel fading. The transmit power is proportional to  $p(U_t) \cdot q(S_t)$ , where

- ▶  $p(\cdot)$  is strictly increasing and convex; moreover  $p(0) = 0$ .
- ▶  $q(\cdot)$  is strictly decreasing and convex.

# Design of rate-allocation protocol in wireless communication

## Primitive variables

- ▶ The initial state  $X_1$  has distribution  $P_X$ .
- ▶ The arrival process  $\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T$  is an i.i.d. process with distribution  $P_W$ .
- ▶ The channel state  $\{S_t\}_{t=1}^T$  is a **stochastic monotone** Markov process, i.e., for any increasing function  $f: \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ,

$$h(s) = \mathbb{E}[f(S_{t+1}) \mid S_t = s] \text{ is increasing.}$$

- ▶  $X_1$ ,  $\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T$ , and  $\{S_t\}_{t=1}^T$  are mutually independent.

A Markov process with transition matrix  $P$  is **stochastic monotone** if  $Q_{ik} = \sum_{j \geq k} P_{ij}$  is increasing in  $i$  for all  $k$ .

## Objective

The objective is to choose a **transmission strategy**  $(g_1, \dots, g_T)$  where

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, S_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

to minimize the total expected cost

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T c(X_t, S_t, U_t) \right]$$

where  $c(X_t, S_t, U_t) = p(U_t) \cdot q(S_t) + d(X_t - U_t)$ .



# Power-delay trade-off as a special case of MDP

## MDP Dynamic Model

System  
Dynamics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t, W_t)$$

Information  
Structure

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

Objective  
Function

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T c_t(X_t, U_t, X_{t+1}) \right]$$

## Power-delay trade-off

$$X_{t+1} = X_t - U_t + W_t$$

$\{S_t\}_{t=1}^T$  independent Markov process

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, S_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T d(X_t - U_t) + p(U_t)q(S_t) \right]$$

Structure of  
Controller

Using **Markov strategies** does not entail any loss of optimality

$$U_t = g_t(X_t, S_t)$$

Dynamic  
program

$$V_{T+1}(x_{T+1}, s_{T+1}) = 0;$$

$$V_t(x_t, s_t) = \min_{u_t \in \mathcal{U}_t} \left\{ c_t(x_t, s_t, u_t) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(X_{t+1}, S_{t+1}) \mid X_t = x_t, S_t = s_t, U_t = u_t] \right\}, \quad t = T, \dots, 1.$$

# Qualitative properties of the value function

**Theorem** (Monotonicity and convexity) ▶  $\forall t: V_t(x, s)$  is increasing in  $x$  for all  $s$ ; and decreasing in  $s$  for all  $x$ .  
▶  $\forall t: V_t(x, s)$  is convex in  $x$  for all  $s$ .

**Theorem** (Structural property) Let  $g^* = (g_1^*, \dots, g_T^*)$  be an optimal strategy. Then,  
▶  $\forall t: g_t^*(x, s)$  is increasing in  $x$  for all  $s$ .  
Thus, the **optimal strategy is monotone**.

# Proof of monotonicity of value function

**Proof** We show that the model satisfies the sufficient conditions (C1) and (C2) for monotonicity of value function (see notes on MDP theory).

First note that  $\mathcal{U}(x) = [0, x]$  satisfies:

- ▶  $\mathcal{U}(x) \subseteq \mathcal{U}(x')$  for all  $x' > x$
- ▶ For any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ ,  $u, u' \in \mathcal{U}$  such that  $u' < u$ , if  $u \in \mathcal{U}(x)$  then  $u' \in \mathcal{U}(x)$ .

Therefore, we can use the Theorem.

C1. For fixed  $x$  and  $u$ ,  $c_t(x, s, u)$  is decreasing in  $s$

For fixed  $s$  and  $u$ ,  $c_t(x, s, u)$  is increasing in  $x$ .

C2. For a fixed  $x$ ,  $\{S_t\}_{t \geq 1}$  is stochastic monotone.

For a fixed  $s$  and  $u$ ,  $\{X_t\}_{t \geq 1}$  is stochastic monotone because for any increasing  $v$  and  $x' \geq x$

$$\mathbb{E}[v(x' - u + W)] \geq \mathbb{E}[v(x - u + W)]$$

Hence, the result follows from the theorem on monotonicity of value functions.

# Backward induction proof of convexity of value function

**Proof** Proceed by backward induction.

**(Convexity)** ▶ **Basis:** Fix  $s$  and  $x > 1$ . Let  $\underline{u} = g_T^*(x-1, s)$  and  $\bar{u} = g_T^*(x+1, s)$ .

$$\begin{aligned} V_T(x-1, s) + V_T(x+1, s) &= Q_T(x-1, s, \underline{u}) + Q_T(x+1, s, \bar{u}) \\ &= d(x-1-\underline{u}) + d(x+1+\bar{u}) + [p(\underline{u}) + p(\bar{u})]q(s) \\ &\stackrel{\text{by convexity of } d(\cdot) \text{ and } p(\cdot)}{\geq} d(x-\underline{v}) + d(x-\bar{v}) + [p(\underline{v}) + p(\bar{v})]q(s) \\ &= Q_T(x, s, \underline{v}) + Q_T(x, s, \bar{v}) \\ &\geq 2 \min_{u \geq 0} Q_T(x, s, u) = 2V_T(x, s) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\underline{v} = \lfloor (\underline{u} + \bar{u})/2 \rfloor$  and  $\bar{v} = \lceil (\underline{u} + \bar{u})/2 \rceil$ .

Thus, for a fixed  $s$ ,  $V_T(x, s)$  is convex in  $x$ .

- ▶ **Induction hypothesis:** For fixed  $s$ ,  $V_{t+1}(x, s)$  is convex in  $x$ .
- ▶ **Induction step:** Follow the same argument as above with  $d(x-u)$  replaced by

$$d(x-u) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x-u+W, S_{t+1}) \mid S_t = s].$$

which is convex in  $x$ .

A direct proof of convexity does not work. For fixed  $s$  and  $u$ , we can show that  $Q_t(x, s, u)$  is convex. But minimum of convex functions is not convex.

Since  $\underline{u} \leq x-1$  and  $\bar{u} \leq x+1$ , we have that  $\underline{v} \leq x$  and  $\bar{v} \leq x$ . Thus, the next state is given by  $x-u+W$ .

# Proof that optimal strategy is monotone

**Proof** Define:

$$h_t(x - u, s) = d(x - u) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x - u + W, S_{t+1}) \mid S_t = s]$$

which is increasing and convex in  $x - u$ . Since  $h_t(x - u, s)$  is convex in  $x - u$ ,  $\partial^2 h_t(x - u, s) / \partial x \partial u \leq 0$ . Hence,  $h_t$  is submodular in  $(x, u)$ .

Thus, for a fixed  $u$ ,

$$Q_t(x, s, u) = p(u) \cdot q(s) + h_t(x - u, s)$$

is submodular in  $(x, u)$ . Therefore, the optimal strategy is increasing in  $x$ . (See notes on MDP theory).



# Additional properties for i.i.d. fading

- Theorem** (i.i.d. fading) Suppose  $\{S_t\}_{t=1}^T$  is an i.i.d. process. Then
- ▶  $\forall t$ :  $V_t(x, s)$  is convex in  $s$  for all  $x$ .
  - ▶  $\forall t$ :  $g_t^*(x, s)$  is increasing in  $s$  for all  $x$ .

**Proof** Since  $\{S_t\}_{t \geq 1}$  is i.i.d.,  $h_t(x - u, s)$  (defined on prev. slide) does not depend on  $s$  and we can write it as  $h_t(x - u)$ . Thus,

$$Q_t(x, s, u) = p(u)q(s) + h_t(x - u)$$

- ▶  $\partial^2 Q_t / \partial s^2 = p(u) \partial^2 q / \partial s^2 \geq 0$ . Hence,  $Q_t$  is convex in  $s$ .

Hence,  $V_t(x, s)$  is convex in  $s$ .

- ▶  $\partial^2 Q_t / \partial s \partial u = \dot{p}(u) \dot{q}(s) \leq 0$ . Hence,  $Q_t$  is submodular in  $(s, u)$ .  
Hence,  $g_t(x, s)$  is increasing in  $s$  (for a fixed  $x$ ).

# Exercises and further reading on power-delay trade-off

1. The mathematical model of power-delay trade-off considered here is from: Randall Berry, “Power and Delay Trade-offs in Fading Channels,” Phd Thesis, MIT, June, 2000, <http://www.ece.northwestern.edu/~rberry/thesis.pdf>
2. For a more detailed characterization of the optimal transmission strategy when the average power goes to zero, see: Randall Berry and Robert Gallager, “Communication over fading channels with delay constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 48, pp. 1135–1149, May 2002.
3. For a more detailed characterization of the optimal transmission strategy when the average delay goes to zero, see: Randall Berry, “Optimal power-delay trade-offs in fading channels—small delay asymptotics,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 3939–3952, June 2013.

# Optimal Stopping Example: Call options





# An optimization problem arising in trading of call options

**Call options** An investor has a **call option** to buy one share of a stock at a fixed price of \$ $p$  and has  $T$  days to **exercise** this option. For simplicity, assume that the investor makes a decision at the beginning of each day.


If the investor exercises the option when the stock price is \$ $x$ , he gets \$ $(x - p)$ . The investor may decide not to exercise this option at all.

Assume that the price of the stock varies with independent increments. More precisely, the value  $X_t$  of the stock on day  $t$  is

$$X_t = X_0 + \sum_{k=1}^t W_k$$

where  $\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T$  is an i.i.d. process independent of  $X_0$ . Assume that  $\mathbb{E}[W_t] = \mu_W < \infty$ .

Let  $\tau$  denote the day stopping time when the investor exercises his option. Find the **optimal investment strategy** for the investor that maximizes  $\mathbb{E}[(X_\tau - p) \mathbb{1}[\tau \leq T]]$ .



Price of a stock

with independent increments

# Mathematical setup of call options

**Notation** State :  $X_t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$

Action:  $U_t \in \{0, 1\}$

- ▶  $U_t = 0$  means do not exercise the option;
- ▶  $U_t = 1$  means exercise the option.


This problem is an **optimal stopping** problem in which a single **stopping decision** has to be made: when to exercise the option.

**Dynamics**  $X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$ , where  $U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$


**Cost** Continuation reward:  $c_t(X_t) = 0$

Stopping reward :  $c^*(X_t) = X_t - p$


**Illustration** Profit earned by the investor for three possible strategies for  $p = 50$ ,  $\mu = 2$ ,  $\sigma^2 = 1$ ,  $x_0 \sim \mathcal{N}(p, \sigma^2)$ ,  $W \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$  (250 sample paths)



Strategy  $U_t = \mathbb{1}[X_t > p + 8\sigma^2]$



Strategy  $U_t = \mathbb{1}[X_t > p + 16\sigma^2]$



Strategy  $U_t = \mathbb{1}[X_t > p + 32\sigma^2]$

# Call options is a special case of a MDP

## MDP Dynamic Model

## Call Options

System  
Dynamics

$$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t, W_t)$$

$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t U_t$$

Information  
Structure

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

$$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

Objective  
Function

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T r_t(X_t, U_t) \right]$$

$$\mathbb{E} [X_\tau - p]$$

Structure of  
Controller

Using **Markov strategies** does not entail any loss of optimality

$$U_t = g_t(X_t)$$

Dynamic  
program

$$V_{T+1}(x_{T+1}) = 0;$$

$$V_t(x_t) = \max_{u_t \in \mathcal{U}_t} \left\{ r_t(x_t, u_t) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \mid X_t = x_t, U_t = u_t] \right\}, \quad t = T, \dots, 1.$$

# Qualitative properties of the value function

**Dynamic**  $V_{T+1}(x) = 0$

**Program**  $V_t(x) = \max\{x - p, \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)]\}$

- Theorem**  
**(Monotonicity properties)**
- ▶  $\forall t$ :  $V_t(x)$  is increasing in  $x$
  - ▶  $\forall t$ :  $V_t(x) - x$  is decreasing in  $x$ .
  - ▶  $\forall x$ :  $V_t(x)$  is decreasing in  $t$ .


**Theorem**  
**(Structural properties)**

There exist numbers  $s_1 \geq s_2 \geq \dots \geq s_T$  such that it is optimal to exercise an option at time  $t$  iff  $x_t \geq s_t$ . Hence, the optimal strategy is of **threshold type**.

# Backward induction proof of monotonicity properties

## Proof of monotonicity properties

Proceed by backward induction.




- ▶ **Basis:**
  - ▶  $V_T(x) = \max\{x - p, 0\}$  is increasing in  $x$ .
  - ▶  $V_T(x) - x = \max\{-p, -x\}$  is decreasing in  $x$ .
  - ▶  $V_T(x) = \max\{x - p, 0\} \geq V_{T+1}(x)$ .
- ▶ **Induction hypothesis:** Assume that all results are true for  $t = t + 1$ .
- ▶ **Induction step:**

- ▶  $V_t(x) = \max\left\{ \underbrace{x - p}_{\text{increasing in } x}, \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)]}_{\text{increasing in } x} \right\}$  is increasing in  $x$ .
- ▶  $V_t(x) - x$  is decreasing in  $x$  because

$$V_t(x) - x = \max\left\{ \underbrace{-p}_{\text{const}}, \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W) - (x + W)] + \mu_W}_{\text{decreasing in } x} \right\}$$

- ▶ By the induction hypothesis  $V_{t+1}(x) \geq V_{t+2}(x)$ . Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} V_t(x) &= \max\{x - p, \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)]\} \\ &\geq \max\{x - p, \mathbb{E}[V_{t+2}(x + W)]\} \\ &= V_{t+1}(x) \end{aligned}$$



# Backward induction proof of the structural properties

**Lemma** If the selling action is optimal at  $x^\circ$ , then it is optimal at all  $x \geq x^\circ$ .



**Proof** Let  $x \geq x^\circ$ . Since the selling action is optimal at  $x^\circ$ .

$$-p \geq \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x^\circ + W)] - x^\circ \geq \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)] - x$$

where the second inequality follows from monotonicity of  $V_t(x) - x$ .

**Proof of the structural property** Define  $S_t = \{x : g_t(x) = 1\}$  or equivalently,  $\{x : x - p \geq \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)]\}$ . The previous lemma shows that  $S_t$  is of the form  $[s_t, \infty)$  where  $s_t = \min S_t$ . This proves the structural result.

To show that  $\{s_t\}_{t=1}^T$  is decreasing, we show that  $S_t \subseteq S_{t+1}$ . Let  $x \in S_t$ , then  $x - p \geq \mathbb{E}[V_t(x + W)] \geq \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(x + W)]$ . Hence,  $x \in S_{t+1}$ .



# Exercises and further reading on option pricing

1. The mathematical model of option pricing considered here was originally investigated in the following paper: Howard M. Taylor, “[Evaluating a Call Option and Optimal Timing Strategy in the Stock Market](#)”, Management Science, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 111-120, Sep 1967.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2628546>

2. Show that if  $\mu_W > 0$ , then  $s_t = \infty$  for all  $t$ . Thus, the result presented here is useful only when the mean drift is negative.

3. **Bonus question:** Find a closed form expression for  $V_t(x)$  when  $W \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ .



# Optimal Stopping Example: Optimal choice





# Optimal choice of the best alternative

**Optimal choice** A decision maker (DM) wants to select the best alternative from a set of  $T$  alternatives. The DM evaluates the alternatives sequentially. After evaluating alternative  $t$ , the DM knows whether alternative  $t$  was the best alternative so far or not. Based on this information, the DM must decide whether to choose alternative  $t$  and stop the search, or to **permanently reject** alternative  $t$  and evaluate remaining alternatives. The DM may reject the last alternative and not make a choice at all.

All alternatives are equally likely to be the best.

Find the **optimal choice strategy** that maximize the probability of picking the best alternative.

This optimization problem is known by different names including **secretary problem** (in which the alternatives correspond to finding the best candidate as a secretary), **marriage problem** (in which the alternatives correspond of find the best spouse), **Googol** (in which the alternatives consist of finding the biggest number), **parking problem** (in which the alternatives correspond to finding the nearest parking spot) and so on.

# Optimal choice of the best alternative

**Notation** State :  $X_t \in \{0, 1\}$ .

- ▶  $X_t = 1$  means that the current alternative is the best so far.

**Action:**  $U_t \in \{0, 1\}$ .

- ▶  $U_t = 1$  means to choose alternative  $t$
- ▶  $U_t = 0$  means to reject alternative  $t$

The problem is an **optimal stopping problem** in which a single stopping decision has to be made: when to select the current alternative.

**Dynamics**  $\{X_t\}_{t=1}^T$  independent with  $\mathbb{P}(X_t = 1) = 1/t$ .

**Reward** The continuation reward is zero.

The DM receives a stopping reward only if the current alternative is the best (i.e., better than all previous alternatives (so  $X_t = 1$ ) and better than all future alternatives (so  $X_{t+1:T} = 0$ )).

The expected stopping reward conditioned on  $X_t$  is

$$r_t^*(X_t) = X_t \cdot \mathbb{P}(X_{t+1:T} = 0 \mid X_t = 1) = X_t \cdot \frac{t}{T}.$$

# Optimal choice is a special case of a MDP

	MDP Dynamic Model	Optimal choice
System Dynamics	$X_{t+1} = f_t(X_t, U_t, W_t)$	$X_{t+1}$ independent
Information Structure	$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$	$U_t = g_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$
Objective Function	$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=1}^T r_t(X_t, U_t) \right]$	$\mathbb{E} [X_\tau \cdot \tau/T]$
Structure of Controller	Using <b>Markov strategies</b> does not entail any loss of optimality $U_t = g_t(X_t)$	
Dynamic program	$V_{T+1}(x_{T+1}) = 0;$ $V_t(x_t) = \max_{u_t \in \mathcal{U}_t} \left\{ r_t(x_t, u_t) + \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(X_{t+1}) \mid X_t = x_t, U_t = u_t] \right\}, \quad t = T, \dots, 1.$	

# Qualitative properties of the value function

Dynamic Program

$$V_{T+1}(x) = 0$$
$$V_t(x) = \max \left\{ x \cdot \frac{t}{T}, \mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}(X_{t+1})] \right\}$$

Lemma Define

$$L_t = V_t(0) = \frac{t}{t+1} V_{t+1}(0) + \frac{1}{t+1} V_{t+1}(1).$$

Then:

$$V_t(1) = \max \left\{ \frac{t}{T}, L_t \right\}$$

and therefore:

$$L_t - L_{t+1} = \left[ \frac{1}{T} - \frac{L_{t+1}}{t+1} \right]^+ \quad \text{with} \quad L_T = 0.$$

Note that it is never optimal to select an alternative if it is not the best so far (i.e.,  $X_t = 0$ ). Thus, we can completely characterize an optimal strategy by solving for  $\{L_t\}_{t=1}^T$  in a backward manner.

# Structure of optimal strategy

## Theorem (Critical time)

- ▶ There exists a **critical time**  $t_0$ ,  $t_0 < T$ , such that it is optimal to reject all alternatives until  $t_0 - 1$ .
- ▶ The critical time is the smallest integer  $t$  such that

$$\sum_{k=t}^{T-1} \frac{1}{k} < 1$$


- ▶ The value functions are given by

$$L_t = \begin{cases} \frac{t}{T} \sum_{k=t}^{T-1} \frac{1}{k} & \text{for } t \geq t_0 \\ L_{t_0} & \text{for } t < t_0 \end{cases}$$

- ▶ The optimal strategy is reject the first  $t_0 - 1$  alternatives and then select the first alternative superior to all predecessors, if one such occurs.
- ▶ For large  $T$ ,  $t_0 \approx T/e$  and the probability of selecting the best candidate is  $\approx 1/e$ .

# Proof of structural properties

Proof



- ▶  $L_t - L_{t-1} \geq 0$ , thus  $L_t$  is non-increasing with  $t$ .
- ▶  $V_t(1) = \max\{t/T, L_t\}$  where  $t/T$  is increasing with  $t$  and  $L_t$  is non-increasing with  $t$ . Thus, the **critical time**  $t_0$  is the first time when  $t/T \geq L_t$ . Since  $L_T = 0$  and  $T/T = 1$ , such a  $t_0 < T$ .
- ▶ For any  $t$  such that  $t/T < L_t$ ,

$$L_{t-1} = L_t + \left[ \frac{1}{T} - \frac{L_t}{t} \right]^+ = L_t.$$

- ▶ For any  $t$  such that  $t/T \geq L_t$ , we have that  $(t+1)/T \geq L_{t+1}$ . Thus,

$$L_t = L_{t+1} + \frac{1}{T} - \frac{L_{t+1}}{t+1} = \frac{t}{T} \left[ \frac{1}{t} + \frac{T}{t+1} L_{t+1} \right]$$

- ▶ For large  $T$ ,

$$\sum_{k=t}^{T-1} \frac{1}{k} \approx \int_{k=t}^T \frac{1}{k} dk = \log \left( \frac{T}{t} \right)$$

Thus,  $t_0 = T/e$ . Moreover,

$$V_1(0) = V_1(1) = L_1 = L_{t_0} \approx \frac{t_0}{T} = \frac{1}{e}.$$

# Exercises and further reading on optimal choice

1. The mathematical model of optimal choice considered here is adapted from John P. Gilbert and Frederick Mosteller, “[Recognizing the Maximum of a Sequence](#),” Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 61, No. 313, pp. 35-73, Mar 1966.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2283044>
2. For a history of the variations of this problem, see Thomas S. Ferguson, “[Who Solved the Secretary Problem?](#),” Statistical Science, vol. 4, no. 3, 282-289, 1989.  
<http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ss/1177012493>
3. Let  $\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T$  be continuous valued i.i.d. random variables with PDF  $f_W$ . Let  $X_t$  be the indicator function of the event that  $\{W_t \geq \max\{W_{1:t-1}\}\}$ . Then show that  $\{X_t\}_{t=1}^T$  are independent and  $\mathbb{P}(X_t = 1) = 1/t$ .

# MDP Example: Energy storage in renewable generation




Image credit: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Giant\\_photovoltaic\\_array.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Giant_photovoltaic_array.jpg)



To be written

### MDP Example: Optimal gambling



### MDP Example: Optimal inventory management



### MDP Example: Optimal power-delay trade-off in wireless communication



### Optimal Stopping Example: Call options



### Optimal Stopping Example: Optimal choice



### MDP Example: Energy storage in renewable generation

